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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted the important role played by money mar-
kets (short-term borrowing and lending markets between banks and bank-like institutions)
in shuﬄing liquidity around the financial system. Globally, these markets experienced se-
vere stress starting with the 9th of August, 2007. On this date, BNP Paribas suspended
withdrawals from some of its hedge funds invested in sub-prime mortgage-backed securi-
ties due to the inability to mark these assets to market. The result was a freeze in the
market for wholesale funding, most notably, in the market for asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP), which caused rollover problems for structured investment vehicles (SIV’s)
and conduits set up by banks as off-balance sheet vehicles for liquidity and regulatory
arbitrage purposes. As the wholesale funding liquidity dried up, banks took the risk of
assets from SIV’s and conduits back on their balance sheets.1 In the period that followed,
inter-bank markets for borrowing and lending also seemed to get adversely affected.
Inter-bank markets are generally the private lender-of-last-resort for banks’ short-term
liquidity needs. Lack of adequate liquidity flow through these markets is considered to
have the potential to substantially impair real and financial sectors. For instance, if
liquidity does not get channeled through the banking system to its most efficient use,
then intermediation to households and corporations could stagnate. Also, central banks’
transmission mechanism for monetary policy could be rendered less effective if its liquidity
provision gets trapped on balance-sheets of some banks instead of lubricating the flow of
1This was either due to reputational reasons or due to liquidity and credit guarantees that sponsoring
banks had contractually provided to the SIV’s and conduits. See Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009).
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credit amongst banks. In turn, central banks may be forced to resort to emergency lending
operations (as has been witnessed through a series of liquidity facilities created by the
New York Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and other
central banks during the crisis).
Our paper is an attempt to understand some of these effects by examining the bank
demand for liquidity and its effect on inter-bank markets during the crisis. We hypothesize
and confirm a precautionary motive to liquidity demand by banks during this period and
investigate its causal effect on inter-bank rates.2 Our broad conclusion is that events
unfolding since August 9, 2007 had the effect of increasing the funding risk or rollover
risk of banks, in response to which banks, especially the weaker ones, hoarded liquidity.
Given their increased opportunity cost of giving up liquidity to other banks, inter-bank
rates rose in both secured and unsecured markets, suggestive of an interest-rate contagion
through the inter-bank market.
Specifically, we study the liquidity demand of large, settlement banks in the UK and its
effect on Sterling money markets before and during the sub-prime crisis – from January
2007 till the end of June 2008. We focus on the settlement banks since they can be
considered as the market makers for money. In other words, most payment flows occur
through these banks. Hence, studying their demand for liquidity in response to the risks
they face and how this demand affects market-wide and bank-specific inter-bank rates
2Such a motive and its effect on markets and the economy have been mentioned often since the
inception of the crisis. See, for example, Financial Times (FT) 12 August 2007: “Scramble for cash
reflects fears for system”; FT 26 March 2008: “Hoarding by banks stokes fear over crisis”; FT 19 May
2008: “Loans to banks limited despite market thawing”.
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provides a natural setting for the questions we wish to answer. We examine bank liquidity
in terms of their reserve balances with the central bank and the price of this liquidity in
terms of the overnight inter-bank rates.
The reserve balances held by banks at a central bank can be understood as their
“checking accounts.”3 A bank’s portfolio decision involves whether to keep reserves in
the form of liquid balances in its checking account for ready draw down during the day
to meet payment; or, to have illiquid claims by extending own reserves to others in the
economy in the form of loans to households and corporations, to other banks through inter-
bank markets, purchase assets such as mortgage-backed securities, etc. Each financial
transaction taking place in the economy (for example, a retail depositor withdrawing from
ATM or a corporation depositing into a money market fund) involves a “debit” from some
bank’s reserve balance and “credit” into another bank’s balance. Not all banks at each
point in the day necessarily have reserves to meet all of their payment activity. Hence,
they use the inter-bank market to exchange reserves. In turn, the total financial activity
in the economy ends up being a large multiplier on the quantity of circulating reserves.
While the aggregate reserves in the economy stay constant (unless altered by the
central bank), by and large a few banks – typically the large ones – play a bigger role in
these transactions and determine the price at which reserves are exchanged in the inter-
bank market. Banks have access to the central bank’s discount window to borrow reserves
overnight but at a penalty. However, generally such borrowing is also associated with the
“stigma” that if borrowing in isolation, a bank might be perceived to be riskier than
3We are grateful to one of our discussants, Arvind Krishnamurthy, for providing this analogy.
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others, triggering a run on the bank.4 Thus, in practice, it is often not the central bank’s
lending rate at the discount window that ends up determining banks’ opportunity cost in
lending reserves to others. Instead, this opportunity cost is determined by the liquidity of
asset markets and wholesale borrowing markets that banks can access to meet their daily
requirement of reserves. During the crisis, these markets got significantly impaired. We
investigate how this affected the portfolio decision of large, settlement banks in the UK
to hold liquidity in the form of reserves, and in turn, how this affected the price at which
they were willing to extend reserves in the inter-bank market.
Our choice of the Sterling money markets is driven primarily by the fact that the
Bank of England (BoE) monetary policy framework offers an attractive way of measuring
a bank’s overnight liquidity as its reserves with the BoE. As we explain in Section 2,
the remuneration offered by the BoE on these reserves (within a band) implies that it
was optimal for banks to park their liquidity in the form of these reserves.5 Further,
under the BoE monetary policy framework, banks are allowed to determine their own
reserves targets at the beginning of each maintenance period (roughly a month), which
the BoE subsequently meets through its open market operations (OMOs). This provides a
strong and direct measure of bank demand for liquidity (what we term as their “overnight
liquidity”), allowing for its separation from fluctuations in bank reserves induced due to
4Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar and Shrader (2010) provide compelling evidence of such a stigma attached
to borrowing from the discount window during the financial crisis of 2007-08.
5In contrast, the Federal Reserve in the United States did not pay interest on reserves until October
2008 so that bank liquidity over and above the reserves requirement would typically not be parked at the
Federal Reserve.
5
supply of reserves by the central bank.6 Finally, since we focus on reserves held by
settlement banks, which form a subset of banks that hold total reserves of the economy,
there are daily shifts in our measure of settlement bank liquidity even when there is no
change affected by the BoE in aggregate reserves in the UK economy.
As our first piece of evidence, we show that settlement bank liquidity experienced a
significant upward jump upon the onset of the sub-prime crisis (see Figure 1).
As our second piece of evidence, we show that this build up of bank liquidity was
precautionary in nature. First, we verify that settlement banks held more liquidity on
days with greater predictable aggregate payments activity. Such response of settlement
bank liquidity to payment activity is non-existent in the pre-crisis period. Next, we
employ the bank-level variation in liquidity, funding risk proxies, solvency risk proxies,
and economic health during the crisis. We find that banks that during the crisis had higher
funding risk or rollover risk, and higher solvency risk hoarded more liquidity. Further,
these banks also held more liquidity in response to increases in payment activity.
In our third piece of evidence, we study the effect of settlement bank liquidity on
market-wide overnight inter-bank rates. In order to subsume any step-variations induced
by policy changes, we look at spreads of the inter-bank rates to BoE’s policy rate. We ob-
tain overnight secured rates (with the UK government’s GILT as collateral), and unsecured
rates from the British Bankers’ Association and Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association,
6We have also studied “total liquidity” that includes the bank collateral as under “double-duty” this
can be employed for intra-day borrowing from the BoE. This collateral which is held in fulfillment of
prudential requirements cannot, however, be used to borrow overnight on the market. Our results are
qualitatively similar for overnight liquidity as well as total liquidity.
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respectively. In normal times, the “arbitrage” hypothesis in money markets postulates
that if inter-bank rates become higher than the BoE policy rate, then banks that experi-
ence exogenous rise in their liquidity that day release the liquidity to other needy banks
in order to capture the spread. This should induce a negative relationship between set-
tlement bank liquidity and inter-bank spreads. We call this the “arbitrage” effect. Our
crucial observation is that this relation may be reversed when the rise in liquidity of set-
tlement banks is endogenous, in particular, a precautionary response to heightened risks
and funding concerns. In this case, settlements banks need to be compensated more for
releasing liquidity to others. We call this the “liquidity” effect.
The results reveal a strong effect of settlement bank liquidity on inter-bank rates,
but in a manner that differs sharply between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. We find
evidence supportive of the liquidity effect: the effect of liquidity is to raise overnight inter-
bank rates in the period during the crisis. In contrast, this relationship is significantly
negative in the period prior to the crisis, consistent with the arbitrage effect of settlement
bank liquidity on inter-bank rates. What is striking is that the effect of settlement bank
liquidity on secured rates – in transactions secured by UK gilts – is as high and significant
as on the unsecured rates.
We interpret these findings to imply that since access to capital markets and wholesale
borrowing in commercial paper markets was impaired for banks, especially for banks with
significant rollover or credit risk, these weaker banks engaged in liquidity hoarding as
a precautionary response. Such hoarding raised borrowing rates for safer banks too,
suggestive of a contagion-style systemic risk operating through inter-bank markets. In
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particular, the overnight Sterling inter-bank rates in the first year of the crisis do not
seem to have been driven purely by counterparty risk concerns of lending banks about
the borrowing banks.
Finally, we use bilateral transaction data which allow us to more cleanly separate
out the precautionary effect from the counterparty risk effect, we find further supportive
evidence for our interpretation. The rate charged by one bank to another bank (the
bilateral spread) during the crisis is negatively associated with the borrower liquidity
buffer but more importantly the rate is positively associated with the lender liquidity
buffer: a lender who has a higher ”demand” for liquidity during the crisis charges a higher
price to release it during the crisis. This finding confirms that the positive relationship
between rate and liquidity observed in the aggregate data during the crisis contains a
precautionary demand effect.
Before proceeding to the remainder of the paper, we stress that our analysis stops in
end of June 2008 (when this paper was initiated). It is no doubt interesting to examine
the period post-June 2008, especially around the collapse of Lehman Brothers. On the
one hand, counterparty risk concerns in inter-bank markets – even at overnight horizons –
are likely to have been a much greater concern for lending banks in this period (as shown
in the Fed Funds market by Afonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2011). On the other hand, a
large number of central bank interventions were already in place by this time to help
banks manage their liquidity better and more were designed within two to four weeks of
Lehman’s collapse, rendering it far more difficult to isolate outcomes attributable to bank
behavior rather than to policy responses. From an empirical identification standpoint, the
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onset of the ABCP funding freeze on 9 August 2007 provides a more attractive “event.”
Section 2 provides the relevant institutional details of the UK payment system and
money markets. Section 3 documents the regime switch in liquidity reserves of banks and
Section 4 shows that liquidity hoardings of banks have a precautionary aspect to them.
Section 5 establishes the effect of liquidity hoardings on inter-bank rates at aggregate and
bilateral level. Section 7 relates our paper to literature and Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
This section provides some important background information. Section 2.1 provides an
overview of the Bank of England (BoE) monetary policy framework. Section 2.2 describes
the structure of the payment system and money markets in the UK, as well as institu-
tional and operational boundaries within which banks are able to manage the liquidity
requirements arising from their daily payment activity. Appendix 1 summarizes the range
of adjustments to the framework the BoE undertook since August 2007 to restore orderly
conditions in money markets.
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2.1 The Monetary Policy Framework7
In May 2007 the BoE assigned operational responsibility of monetary policy to its newly
created Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The MPC meets at least once a month to set
the rate of interest. The MPC is responsible for setting the appropriate rate to meet the set
inflation target (based on the Consumer Price Index) by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The inflation target is 2 per cent, with a 1 per cent tolerance range. The BoE implements
monetary policy by lending to the money market at the official repo rate chosen by the
MPC. Eligible assets include gilts, Treasury bills and other government bonds. Keeping
the (secured) overnight market rates close to the official rate is the primary objective.
A combination of reserves accounts, reserves averaging and the standing facility corridor
is used to limit volatility in overnight interest rates over each maintenance period. We
explain these concepts and tools next.
37 UK banks and building societies that are members of the reserves scheme set
their “target” balances at the beginning of each maintenance period (Monetary Policy
Committee’s decision date until the next) and undertake to hold balances, remunerated
at the official Bank rate (or the policy rate). The reserve balances should on average meet
the pre-set target over the maintenance period. Participation in the reserves-averaging
scheme is voluntary other than for the first-tier, or in other words, the settlement banks,
7This section relies heavily on ”The framework for the Bank of Eng-
land’s operations in the sterling money markets (The ’Red Book’)” available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2006/054.htm, Clews (2005), various issues of
the Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin (Q3 2007–Q4 2008), and unpublished notes by Bank of
England staff.
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which join the scheme automatically because their role in the payments system entails
them having reserves accounts, and thereby maintaining balances, with the central bank.
If a member’s average balance is within a +/- 1% range around the target (averaging
reserves balances at the end of each calendar day over the maintenance period as a whole),
the balance would be remunerated at the official Bank rate. Averaging of reserves is
expected to help keep overnight market interest rates in line with the official Bank rate
throughout the maintenance period as it leads banks to manage their balances actively
and continuously arbitrage between running down their reserves balances or borrowing
from the market.
Open Market Operations (OMOs) are used by the BoE to provide the amount of
money needed to enable reserves banks, in aggregate, to achieve their self-determined
reserves targets. Hence, in the BoE monetary policy framework, except for emergency
injections, the aggregate quantity of reserves is a response to the demand of reserves
banks.8 OMOs comprise short-term repos at the official Bank rate, long-term repos at
market rates determined in variable-rate tenders, and outright purchases of high-quality
bonds. The BoE accepts as counterparties in its open market operations (OMOs): (1)
8The Bank of England Red Book says: “The quantity of central bank money, and equivalently the
size and composition of the Bank’s sterling liabilities, is largely demand-determined... The Bank ensures
that its stock of short-term repo lending on Banking Department is always at least as large as aggregate
reserves targets, so that it can adjust the size of its weekly OMOs to offset any change in banks’ aggregate
reserves targets or any other sterling flows (so-called autonomous factors) between the banking system
and the Banking Department’s balance sheet. Matching aggregate reserves with short-term repo lending
also avoids interest rate exposure on Banking Department as the Bank pays the official Bank Rate on
targeted reserves and earns the official Bank Rate on its short-term repo lending.”
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banks and building societies eligible to participate in the reserves scheme; and (2) other
banks, building societies and securities dealers authorized under the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 that are active intermediaries in the sterling markets.
If money markets are disrupted the BoE can increase its lending via OMOs above the
aggregate target chosen by banks, while keeping control of market interest rates by paying
the official rate on these larger balances either by increasing reserves targets pro rata or
by widening the range (+/- 1% in normal times) around existing targets.
Standing deposit and (collateralized) lending facilities are also available to eligible
UK banks and building societies and may be used on demand as emergency sources of
financing. In normal circumstances they carry a penalty, relative to the official Bank rate,
of +/- 25 basis points (bps) on the final day of the monthly reserves maintenance period,
and of +/- 100 basis points on all other days. Their usage, however, is subject to the
“stigma” problem, especially during a crisis, as explained in the introduction (Section 1).
2.2 Structure of the Payment System and Money Markets
There are about 400 active banks in the UK. The UK large-value payment system has
a “tiered” structure. Tiering means that many (usually smaller) second-tier banks do
not settle at the central bank but do so on the accounts of few (larger) first-tier banks
also referred to as the settlement banks or clearers. 15 banks are direct participants in
the large-value payment system called CHAPS. Two of the direct participants are foreign
owned banks with a narrow retail activity in the UK. In our sample of large, settlement
banks, we exclude these two foreign banks since their liquidity kept in the form of the BoE
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reserves underestimates their overall liquidity, possibly substantially. We also exclude the
BoE and the CLS bank (the clearing bank) and the one bank which became a settlement
bank only in October 2008 (outside of our sample period). Hence, we are left with ten
large, settlement banks.
CHAPS is used for business-to-business payments, for example, by solicitors/licensed
conveyancers to transfer the purchase price of a house between the bank accounts of
those involved, and by individuals buying or selling a high-value item, such as a car, who
need a secure, urgent, same-day guaranteed payment. Hence most high-value wholesale
payments go through CHAPS. There is, however, no lower limit on transaction values,
and the system can be used for low-value (retail) payments when same-day finality is
required. Importantly however, financial transactions are not settled through CHAPS
but through the securities settlement system.
Money markets or inter-bank markets allow participants to manage short-term liquid-
ity positions that arise from their daily payment activity. The tiered structure described
above for the payment system is also reflected in money-market activities. The key players
in the Sterling market across all instruments and maturities are the UK clearing banks,
other large UK banks, and large US and European banks. The provision of liquidity
through the system operates via a ‘top-down’ structure. Along the top tier, the big four
‘clearers’ provide funding horizontally to each other and vertically to other counterparties
(typically building societies and European banks with whom they have an established
relationship). Smaller players are not inclined to provide liquidity horizontally to com-
petitors and instead are more likely to pass it vertically up the system. So below the top
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tier, horizontal movement is very limited.
Besides the inter-bank markets banks manage short-term liquidity needs via their
reserves balances held at the central bank. Subject to meeting the monthly target balance
and avoiding overnight overdrafts, reserves balances can be varied freely to meet day-to-
day liquidity needs. For example, funds can be moved on and off reserves accounts up
to the close of the payments system in order to accommodate unexpected end-of-day
payment inflows and outflows. In this way, reserves balances can be used by banks as a
liquidity buffer.
Reserves banks can also change their reserves target from month to month in response
to, for example, variations in the size or uncertainty of their payments flows. Settlement
banks can also draw on reserves balances during the day to bridge any gap between
payments made and expected receipts. For this purpose, holding reserves is an alternative
to borrowing from the central bank during the day against eligible collateral. The routine
provision of intra-day liquidity to settlement banks against eligible collateral together
with reserves balances, provides the necessary lubricant for the working of the Sterling
payments system, ensuring that settlement banks are able to make payments in advance
of expected receipts later in the day. Intra-day lending from the BoE to the settlement
banks is interest-free, but if not reimbursed by the end of the day it entails a large penalty
(not publicly specified in the Bank of England’s Red Book describing its monetary policy).
Individual institutions also tend to have plans to manage liquidity in times of stress.
Smaller banks can obtain liquidity insurance from larger banks by paying for committed
lines of credit. But larger banks generally cannot buy insurance from each other without
14
imposing an unacceptable level of (contingent) counterparty credit risk. Thus, they have
to self-insure, which they do as discussed before by (i) holding balances on their reserves
account at the BoE; (ii) keeping high-quality assets that can be exchanged for central bank
money in the open market operations (OMOs); and, (iii) through the Bank’s standing (or
semantically what is the same as, emergency) lending facility.
3 Regime Shifts in Settlement Bank Liquidity
We now turn to our first result which exploits an event study approach to investigating
the settlement banks’ liquidity during the crisis.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We measure the settlement banks’ overnight liquidity as the sum of the reserves accounts
held by the ten UK first-tier banks at the central bank and measured at 5 am each day.
The data are obtained from the Bank of England. All data are daily and cover the period
02 January 2007 to 30 June 2008. The first row of Table 1 (under ”aggregate variables”)
reports various descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum,
quantiles) of the liquidity held by first-tier banks. This is reported for the whole sample
period along with a test of the difference in means between the two sub-periods (pre- and
post-August 9th 2007). We see from the difference that liquidity held by first-tier banks
is 27 per cent higher post August 9th. These differences are also seen in Figure 1 and are
significant statistically at the 1% level.
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3.2 Event Study
To understand these shifts in banks’ liquidity without pre-supposing the break points,
we statistically identify the exact periods when settlement banks revised their liquidity
demand and relate these to relevant market news obtained from Bloomberg’s real-time
news service. We employ the Bai and Perron (1998) test which estimates the timing
of permanent level shifts in a time series. This method applies a sequential algorithm
that searches all possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks the
set that produces the maximum goodness-of-fit. Statistical tests then determine whether
the improved fit produced by allowing an additional break is sufficiently large given what
would be expected by chance (due to noise). We apply the test to the logarithm of liquidity
in order to mute the effect of outliers (and in subsequent tests to allow interpretation of
coefficients in terms of elasticities).
Table 2 reports results. The test identifies two breaks in the overnight liquidity. The
first break, a 24% increase in overnight liquidity, occurred around September 11th 2007.
This is one month later than ignition of the sub-prime crisis on 9th August 2007. This
is because banks are allowed to revise their reserves targets only from one Monetary
Policy Committee meeting to the next. The first increase in the aggregate reserves target
therefore occurred on September 6th 2007, the date the first MPC meeting took place
after the sub-prime crisis took hold.9
9One can observe further increases in the overnight liquidity from mid-September onwards following
the BoE decisions to inject extra liquidity in its regular weekly open market operations (see Appendix 1
for details on the adjustments to the monetary policy framework undertaken during the crisis).
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At the second break, March 13th 2008, first-tier banks increased their overnight liq-
uidity by an additional 15.5%. The second break coincides exactly with the collapse of
Bear Stearns. The Bear Stearns episode reflected yet another (potential) freeze, this time
in the wholesale market for borrowing secured (“repo”) against highly rated asset-backed
securities. Traditionally, banks had always assumed they would be able to access the repo
market for short-term liquidity needs. The Bear Stearns collapse revealed however that
banks could no longer assume that the worst case liquidity stress scenario was simply the
drying up of unsecured funding; secured funding could dry up too. This further intensified
the funding needs and rollover risks faced by banks. Thus, the liquidity response of banks
on March 13th, 2008 is also consistent with a precautionary motive. Note that in contrast
to the delayed response following August 9th 2007, the liquidity demand of banks reacted
more or less immediately to Bear Stearns’ collapse. This was possible due to the BoE
decision on October 4th 2007 to widen the band around target within which reserves are
remunerated from +/-1% to +/-30% (as described in Appendix 1).10
4 Evidence of the Precautionary Motive
While the higher reserves targets may have reflected anticipation of heightened funding
needs and rollover risks, one needs to consider also the fact that banks had access to
10In particular, if there is an upward shock to reserves demand within a maintenance period, the
band widening allowed banks to demand additional reserves without incurring penalty for deviating from
targets, and allowed the BoE to supply additional reserves without needing to drain reserves later in the
maintenance period.
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BoE’s standing facilities as an alternative. Hence, the preference for reserves as a way
of building liquidity can also be interpreted as a reduced tolerance for the risk of using
BoE’s standing facilities, most likely due to the potential “stigma” of accessing them
during period of market stress. Specifically, the marginal benefit of an additional unit of
reserves is the insurance it provides against the risk of having to use the standing facilities
(SF) following an unexpected payment shock in late trading. The expected cost of using
the SF is a function of the direct penalty in using it (which remained constant or in fact
was lowered by the BoE during the crisis), the indirect penalty due to stigma, and the size
of unexpected payment shocks. This cost must be traded off against the opportunity cost
of not deploying elsewhere an additional unit of reserves, which is typically the spread
between policy rate and the overnight (secured) market rate.
Across maintenance periods, i.e., from one MPC meeting to another, reserves targets
can themselves be varied. However within a maintenance period, settlement banks can
increase their liquidity buffer only through other means: by reducing lending to households
and firms, by selling assets or by reducing net lending to second-tier banks. We do not
observe the exact actions taken by banks to vary their liquidity buffers. For instance,
lending data are available only for five of the banks and that too only at monthly frequency.
No data on asset sales are easily available. And lending volumes can be reasonably
imputed at individual bank level only for overnight unsecured lending, but not for secured
and term lending. Nevertheless, we explain below that we can still design empirical tests
that enable inference about the reasons for variation in bank demand for liquidity.
In order to tease the tradeoff faced by banks in building up reserves, we examine how
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uncertainty in aggregate payment shock affects settlement bank liquidity and explore
interaction of this uncertainty with bank-level funding risk and balance-sheet condition.
That is, we investigate the time-series variation of total settlement bank liquidity and also
the cross-sectional variation in liquidity demand of individual settlement banks on a day
to day basis.
Our first test of the precautionary motive consists of estimating changes in the liquidity
demand of settlement banks in response to changes in aggregate payment activity. The
underlying idea is that on days of high aggregate payment activity, some individual banks
might end up with significant payment needs but the distribution – that is which individual
banks will face these needs – is uncertain. The data for payment activity are from the
Bank of England payment database. The daily payment activity is measured as the sum
of all transactions that flow through the large-value payment system (CHAPS), net of
inter-bank loans activity.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for payment activity pre-crisis and during the
crisis. Strikingly, there is virtually no difference in the economic magnitude of payment
activity by itself over the two periods. This is important for our identification to follow as
it suggests that any differential response of settlement bank liquidity to payment activity
likely arises from bank-level differences in the perceived cost of managing payment shocks
through means other than central bank reserves. Figure 2 plots the payment activity (in
logarithm). At first sight, these series appear to be white noise processes.11
11A Portmanteau test reported in Appendix 2 confirms this observation. The lag-one autoregressive
coefficient is small (not reported). The Portmanteau test for lag-one has p-value of 0.29 rejecting the null
hypothesis that the first lag autocorrelation is different from zero.
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Importantly though, payment risk measured as daily changes in aggregate payment
activity is predictable by banks due to calendar effects. In fact, APACS, the UK payments
association, claims to be able to forecast close to 100 per cent of the fluctuations in
aggregate payment flows (not their distribution across banks). Appendix 2 reports the
effects on aggregate payment activity of a non-exhaustive set of calendar dummies, which
includes holidays in United States and the United Kingdom, and fixed effects for day of
the week, quarter, and beginning and end of each month. With these few dummies we
are able to predict 40 per cent of the variation in payment value. Economically important
calendar effects are (i) United States holidays which are associated with a 58 per cent drop
in the value of payments activity, (ii) days around the United Kingdom holidays when
there are, for instance, higher than usual deposit withdrawals; and (iii) fourth quarter
effect which is negative.
To investigate how banks adjusted their liquidity reserves at the start of the day in
response to aggregate payment activity for the day (which we have shown to be predictable
due to calendar effects), and whether this adjustment differed before and during the crisis,
we estimate the following specification:
OLiqit = ωi +
2∑
s=1
δs · breakst + α · Pt +
2∑
s=1
βs · Pt ∗ breakst
+ µ ·Xi(t−1) +
2∑
s=1
γs ·Xi(t−1) ∗ breakst + εit , (1)
where i stands for a bank subscript, t for the time subscript, OLiqit is the overnight
liquidity of settlement banks, ωi is a bank fixed effect, and Pt is the aggregate payment
activity predicted by calendar effects. Predicted aggregate payment activity is in loga-
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rithm (to reduce the impact of outliers). Bank liquidity is in percentage of a standard
deviation variation from the average liquidity in the first half of 2007 (so as to represent
abnormal variations in bank liquidity demand). The breaks are based on estimations in
Table 2: break1t is a post September 11th 2007 dummy; break
2
t is a post March 13th 2008
dummy.12
Hence, the first line of the specification allows for a structural break in settlement bank
liquidity at these break points, tests for its sensitivity to predictable aggregate payment
activity, and whether this sensitivity changed around the break points. The second line
of the specification allows for a test of whether settlement bank liquidity was higher for
some banks and more so following the break points. We employ five specifications with
different bank characteristics Xi (lagged, wherever applicable), that capture the bank’s
funding risk and realized health during the crisis:
1. Mismatch-I: The ratio of loan assets to retail deposits as an indicator of maturity
mismatch.
2. Mismatch-II: Total assets divided by retail deposits, as another measure of maturity
mismatch.
3. Deposit structure: The ratio of “sight” deposits to time deposits13, as an indicator
of funding risk in the bank’s liability structure.
12We exclude break1t for the interaction effect as there is only one month between that break and break
2
t
and thus little statistical power for its identification.
13”Sight” deposits are short-term deposits that can be withdrawn on demand at no cost for the depos-
itor. Time deposits in contrast are long-term deposits.
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4. Equity price fall: The cumulative equity price fall in number of standard deviation
units from the average price in 2006, as a measure of solvency shock.
5. Risk-weighted assets: The ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, as a regulatory
measure of asset risk.
Fall in retail deposits could help account for the fact that while some banks were di-
rectly threatened by the meltdown of the ABCP market, they were rendered especially
fragile if they had little in terms of retail deposits to start with, or also experienced a
flight of retail deposits to safer banks.14 While losses disclosed are an imperfect mea-
sure of realized solvency issues (since some banks were prompter at reporting losses than
other banks), deterioration implied by market measures (equity prices) should incorpo-
rate better public information available on the financial condition of a bank, including
anticipation of losses and not just realized losses.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of these variables. There is significant variability
across banks in the measures of bank health and funding risk. Equity prices displayed
dramatic swings over the sample period for many banks. While some banks gained re-
tail deposits relative to assets (a fall in the assets to deposits ratio), others experienced
14A classic example of this was the run on Northern Rock in September 2007. Shin (2009) provides
descriptive statistics showing that Northern Rock’s problems stemmed from its high leverage coupled
with reliance on institutional investors for short-term funding. An analysis of the structure of its balance
sheet pre- and post-run shows that the first and most damaging run on the bank took place in its short-
and medium-term wholesale liabilities, but that once its problems materialized, it also experienced a
retail run, mainly through electronic deposit accounts.
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significant losses15.
The overall results for estimation of the benchmark specification are reported in Table
3. The results in columns (1) through (6) suggest that following the events that unfolded
since 9 August 2007, banks hoarded liquidity.
Column (1) shows that before the crisis predictable increases in aggregate payment
activity are associated with a decline in the reserves balances of settlement banks which
means an outflow of liquidity from settlement banks to either second tier banks or house-
holds. In contrast, column (2) shows that starting August 9th, 2007 (break1t ), there is
a significant positive incremental relationship between settlement bank liquidity demand
and payment activity. In other words, reserves held by settlement banks rose with higher
value of payment activity, during the crisis relative to before. This suggests that settle-
ment banks piled up excess reserves and hoarded liquidity away from second-tier banks
and households. Column (3) shows the incremental response is not magnified following
March 13th, 2008(break2t ). And, columns (4)–(6) show that the results are robust to con-
trolling for lagged deviation from targets, maintenance period fixed effects, and a dummy
for the uncovered OMO that occurred in June 2007.16
15The summary statistics reported are for the whole sample period. The top and bottom 5% of the
distribution of losses gives an idea of how the variables look like during the crisis.
16An important event in Sterling money markets prior to the onset of the crisis in August 2007 was
the so-called “uncovered” OMO. In an OMO, counterparties bid for a quantity at a fixed BoE Rate.
This fixed-rate bidding has one potential undesirable consequence that given the amount of reserves each
counterparty actually desires, the size of their bid is determined by their expectation (or guess) as to
how much other counterparties will bid for. That can set up a dynamic where, from week to week, the
extent to which a short-term repo OMO is “covered” (that is, reserves required by banks to meet their
23
In Table 4, we find that higher bank risk is associated with increased liquidity demand
during the crisis. Greater funding risk (captured by the two maturity Mismatch proxies)
and greater solvency risk (captured by Equity price fall and RWA) are both associated
with higher demand for liquidity during the crisis. Figure 4 depicts this effect graphically.
It shows a dramatic rise in liquidity demand among high risk banks relative to low risk
banks as the crisis unfolds, the risk measure being respectively whether the bank is in the
top three or bottom three in loans to retail deposits during the crisis. The figure looks
similar with other risk measures. The figures underscore results of Table 4 that high risk
banks revised their reserves targets soon after inception of the crisis, whereas low risk
banks did so only in 2008 (and less strongly at that).
We complement this benchmark analysis with a specification that allows for further
heterogeneity in the precautionary behavior of banks. We do this by interacting bank risk
characteristics with predictable payment activity. We split the sample of banks in high
risk, medium risk and low risk banks based on top three, middle four, or bottom three,
targets are supplied through the OMO) is on a rising or falling trend. If, for example, a counterparty
thinks its peers will bid for much more than they in fact desire, then it too must do the same in order
to be allotted roughly what it actually wants. If the cover ratio is on a declining dynamic, that can
lead eventually to an “uncovered” OMO, as happened in June 2007, before the turmoil, reserves were
eventually undersupplied and inter-bank rates went up dramatically due to lack of reserves relative to
banks’ targets.
From the standpoint of our analysis, the uncovered OMO raises the issue that any differential effect
we observe pre- and during the crisis might be due to this June/July 2007 episode, which precedes the
most interesting period of our analysis (August 2007 onward). Hence we check robustness of our results
by controlling for the uncovered OMO episode through a dummy variable.
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respectively of the risk measure.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. They show a more pronounced eco-
nomic magnitude for the precautionary reaction to payment activity during the crisis
among banks with troubled balance-sheet conditions (i.e., among high-risk and medium-
risk banks relative to the low-risk banks). And the difference between strong and weak
banks is statistically significant at the 5% to 1% level for all risk metrics we employ except
for deposit fragility.
To sum up, the findings in Tables 3-5 and Figure 4 confirm our hypothesis that the increase
in the settlement bank liquidity witnessed during the crisis reflected precautionary intent.
During the crisis banks hoarded liquidity against payment risks, but not so pre-crisis.
Further, this precautionary reaction was unequal across banks, being more pronounced
at banks with greater balance-sheet funding risk and greater solvency concerns.
5 Effect of Liquidity Hoarding on Money Market Rates
In the second half of our empirical analysis, we explore what were the consequences of the
increase in hoarding of liquidity by settlement banks for inter-bank markets. In particular,
we document how movements in liquidity demand by banks altered inter-bank rates before
and during the crisis.
Theoretically, banks set reserves targets to equal the marginal cost and the marginal
benefit of holding one additional unit of reserves. In normal times, the cost of finding
alternative sources of funding and even using the central bank’s emergency standing facil-
ities to meet liquidity needs is low due to the absence of stigma. Then, reserves averaging
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over a maintenance period ensures that market interest rates do not diverge materially
from the policy rate. This money-market “arbitrage effect” works as follows. Suppose
that overnight market interest rates are higher on a particular day than the policy rate.
Then a bank can run down its reserves balance in order to lend in the market, expecting
to be able to borrow more cheaply in the market in order to hold higher reserves balance
on subsequent days. By contrast, if market rates are lower than the policy rate, then a
bank can borrow in the market in order to build up its reserves balance.
Typically, the effectiveness of this arbitrage mechanism is affected by the width of
the range of reserves allowed by the monetary policy implementation. It is also affected
by the willingness of banks to take reserves close to the edge of their ranges given that
unexpected late payment flows could leave them needing to use a standing facility at
the end of the day. In stressed funding conditions, the difficulty of raising wholesale
funding and stigmatization of the standing facility is high. This can curb active liquidity
management by banks in the form of arbitraging deviations in money market rates from
the policy rate. In essence, there are limits to the arbitrage (as argued in the context of
broader financial markets by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
With such limits to arbitrage, the incentive for banks is to hold larger reserves over
the maintenance period to reduce the risk of having to use the standing facilities to meet
unexpected late payment shocks. The private benefit of holding one additional unit of
reserves is high and hence banks charge a high liquidity premium to release their reserves.
In other words, in stressed conditions banks release their liquidity only if the return on
liquidity exceeds the high private benefit due to their precautionary demand, causing
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inter-bank rates to be higher. We call this the “liquidity” effect.
In our empirical work, we aim to identify both these effects: first, the arbitrage effect
that exogenous increases in settlement bank liquidity would drive inter-bank rates toward
the policy rate, and the liquidity effect that endogenous (in our case, precautionary)
increases in settlement bank liquidity would drive inter-bank rates above the policy rate.
5.1 Regression Specification
The specification we estimate to link settlement bank liquidity to market-wide inter-bank
rates is as follows:
Yt = αy ·OLiqt + β1y ·OLiqt ∗ break1t + break1t + εyt (2)
where Yt is a vector of two variables: the secured and the unsecured inter-bank rate
spread to the policy rate (in bps). OLiqt is overnight liquidity aggregated across all
UK settlement banks and expressed in logarithm. break1t is a post September 11th 2007
dummy.
Our hypothesis is that in the pre-crisis period, the effect of settlement bank liquidity
on inter-bank rate spreads is negative (the arbitrage effect) whereas during the crisis
period, the effect is positive (the liquidity effect).
5.2 Money Markets Data
To estimate specification (2), we use daily market-wide interest rates data from the British
Bankers’ Association and Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association. The secured rate is
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the Gilt Collateral (GC) rate. The unsecured overnight rate is the SONIA rate.17 Table
1 also reports descriptive statistics of the rates data. The secured rate spread to the
policy rate is 6.25bps on average with a large standard deviation of 12.65bps, whereas
the unsecured rate spread to the policy rate is 11.47bps with a variability of 13.31bps.
Figure 3 shows that sharp movements in the overnight rate spreads, especially in August
and September 2007 (rising in the 50 to 100 bps range) and again in March 2008 (rising
up to 30 to 35 bps), have coincided with negative market news, e.g., loss announcements
and bailouts (see the timeline of news in Table 2).18
In the last two columns of table 1 we report the differences in rates and liquidity
between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period, and in parentheses these differences
excluding the week of the uncovered OMO. It might seem a puzzling observation that
the secured rate has increased more than the unsecured rate, even if by a small margin.
Note that a deterioration in the quality of collateral pledged cannot be an explanation for
why secured rates have increased more from before crisis to during the crisis, compared
to unsecured rates, because we focus on the UK Gilt rate where quality of collateral was
close to unquestionable (at least until the Lehman bankruptcy). In secured transactions
banks can also manage risk by varying haircuts. Available data however show that for
17SONIA stands for Sterling Over Night Index Average. It tracks actual Sterling overnight funding
rates experienced by market participants.
18We explain in footnote 14 that an “uncovered” OMO caused a peak in overnight rates in the last
week of June 2007. As a result of this peak in the pre-crisis period, the unsecured rate spread is on
average unchanged from before the crisis to the crisis period, and the secured rate spread is too only 2.41
bps higher during the crisis than pre-crisis.
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transactions secured by government bonds haircuts have barely moved during the crisis
(see Allen and Carletti (2008) Table 1 and Bank for International Settlements (2010) Table
1). Coincidentally, both the secured volume and the unsecured volume have increased
post-August 9th 2007, but the increase has also been more than twice larger for secured
lending (45% against 13%). Hence, one possibility for the greater rise in the secured
spread is heightened market segmentation during the crisis, that is, different sets of banks
borrowing in the two markets. We entertain this possibility in a subsequent section
where we analyze unsecured volumes at bilateral level in overnight inter-bank markets.
Not surprisingly, differences in rates are more important if we exclude the week of the
uncovered OMO from the pre-crisis period.
5.3 Aggregate evidence
Estimations of specification (2) are reported in Table 6 where the dependent variable is
either the secured or the unsecured rate spread to policy rate (in bps). We find that for
both secured and unsecured spreads, a higher level of liquidity held by settlement banks is
associated with a significant decline in overnight spreads (the arbitrage effect) in the period
before the crisis. However, during the crisis the incremental effect is positive (the liquidity
effect). This is true whether aggregate bank liquidity is measured as (logarithm of) total
reserves balances of settlement banks (columns under (1)) on a day, or as percentage
deviation of total reserves balances on a day from aggregate target of reserves set by
settlement banks (in a given maintenance period). It is important to note that our
estimates of the liquidity effect tend to be of similar magnitude for the secured rate and
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the unsecured rate, and in fact somewhat stronger for the unsecured rate.
These results confirm our hypotheses: in stressed conditions banks release their (pre-
cautionary) excess liquidity only at a liquidity premium that compensates them for the
cost of alternatives, such as the direct cost of using the standing facility, the indirect
stigma cost, and costs of liquidating assets or raising wholesale finance in illiquid and
frozen markets. Overall, we interpret our findings – especially the fact that the nature
and the magnitude of arbitrage and liquidity effects on inter-bank rates are similar for
secured and unsecured inter-bank lending – to imply that Sterling money markets expe-
rienced stress during the crisis not necessarily (or just) due to counterparty risk concerns
of lending banks about borrowing banks. Instead, the findings suggest that the stress was
(also) due to banks engaging in precautionary liquidity hoarding due to their own credit
risk and funding risk. Such hoarding raised the lending rates charged in secured as well
as unsecured inter-bank markets.
6 Evidence from bilateral data
We find corroborating evidence for our interpretation when we analyze bilateral transac-
tions data. We analyze bilateral spreads and volumes in the unsecured inter-bank market,
after employing the Furfine (1999) algorithm to identify inter-bank borrowing and repay-
ment transactions. Note that such data are unavailable for the secured market as it works
largely through a third-party broker arrangement. The sample covers 10 UK banks over
22 maintenance periods in the period January 2007 to June 2008. To obtain maintenance
period level data from the transaction level data we aggregate volumes transacted between
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two banks within a maintenance period and obtain the volume-weighted average interest
rate by maintenance period.
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics of the data. There is considerably more variabil-
ity in the bilateral data than reflected in the aggregate data. For example, the unsecured
inter-bank spread (transaction rate minus the policy rate) charged by one bank to an-
other varies between −87 basis points and 110 basis points. Variability in volume is also
important. The proportion of non-active bilateral trades (zero volumes) in our sample
has increased from about 20% before August 2007 to above 30% after August 2007.
We estimate the relationship between these dependent variables (bilateral spread and
volume) and lender and borrower liquidity, before and during the crisis. If lender liquidity
also matters in affecting a given borrower’s cost of borrowing, then it would suggest that
in deciding to extend a loan and at what price a bank is also concerned by its own future
ability to borrow rather than just by its counterparty’s characteristics.
Note that the bilateral spread is observed only for non-zero volumes. Since between
20% to 30% of the bilateral relationships in our data are inactive, we use a specification
that corrects for sample selection where the probability of a positive trade between two
parties is predicted in the first stage by the amount of bilateral payments between them
net of inter-bank loans. Since UK banks have recourse to the overnight inter-bank market
to raise liquidity to fund their payment activity, there is a strong link between bilateral
lending activity and bilateral payment activity. The estimation of the selection equation
is reported in Appendix 3.
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Then, the specification used for the bilateral spread is as follows:
rijt = αr +Xitβ
1
r +Xjtβ
2
r +Xitβ
3
r ∗ crisis+Xjtβ4r ∗ crisis+mr + γrmillst + εrt (3)
where t is the time subscript (changes with maintenance period), rijt is the spread charged
by lender i to borrower j, Xi and Xj are lender and borrower reserve targets respectively
(scaled by their respective payment activities to control for size), crisis is a post August
2007 dummy, and mr are maintenance periods fixed effects. mills is the inverse mills
ratio derived from a selection equation that expresses the probability of a positive trade
between two banks as a function of their bilateral payment activity, using estimates from
Appendix 3. Note that banks choose their reserves target at the start of a maintenance
period and that their choice cannot be revised until the next maintenance period.
To explore both the intensive and extensive margin of trade, we also test a tobit
specification for bilateral volume as follows:
Vijt = αv +Xitβ
1
v +Xjtβ
2
v +Xitβ
3
v ∗ crisis+Xjtβ4v ∗ crisis+mv + εvt (4)
where Vijt is the bilateral volume transacted (scaled by the lender payment activity as a
proxy for lender size), and other variables are as in the bilateral spread specification (3).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that borrower and lender liquidity holdings
(scaled by payment activity) are important determinants of the spread during the crisis
(not before): the slopes of the liquidity demand and supply curves become steeper during
the crisis. Importantly the positive relationship between rate and liquidity observed in the
aggregate data is confirmed in the bilateral data by a positive relationship between lender
liquidity and the rate they charge to release that liquidity during the crisis. The effect is
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also economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase in lender reserves target
is associated with a 1.3 basis points increase in the spread charged.
Further, an important concern that the aggregate relationship is the result of a positive
correlation between borrower credit quality, borrower liquidity hoarding, and borrowing
rate does not find support in bilateral data. In fact, the correlation between borrower
liquidity holdings and the rate is insignificant pre-crisis and negative during the crisis.
It is equally interesting to consider simultaneously the volumes of bilateral activity.
Tobit estimates for inter-bank activity in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 show that bi-
lateral activity in inter-bank markets tends to be negatively related with both borrower
and lender liquidity. During the crisis, the inter-bank activity becomes somewhat less
negatively associated with lender liquidity, but the overall effect remains negative and
economically large. Put together with columns (1) and (2), this suggests that consistent
with an endogenous view of bank liquidity, banks hold liquidity in order to reduce their
costs of borrowing in the inter-bank market (potentially leaving the market altogether)
and when they do so they also charge more for lending in the inter-bank market (again,
potentially not lending in the market at all).
To summarize, we find that the positive aggregate relationship between inter-bank
rate and bank liquidity during the crisis is driven by a positive relationship between the
liquidity balances of lenders and the rate they charge on the loans they extend during the
crisis. This is consistent with a precautionary demand effect: lenders who have a higher
”demand” for liquidity during the crisis charge a higher rate to release it.
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7 Related Literature
Our paper cuts across a number of different strands of literature, in particular, on (i)
reasons why firms hoard cash, (ii) the function played by inter-bank markets and the
reasons why they may experience stress, (iii) the transmission of bank-level stress as
contagion in the financial sector, and (iv) the micro-structure of inter-bank markets in
terms of reserves requirements by central banks and the monetary policy.
The fact that the onset of the sub-prime crisis led banks to hoard liquidity for pre-
caution against funding risk finds parallel in the corporate finance literature on financial
constraints. In this literature (see, for example, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004,
and the references therein), when firms cannot pledge a sufficient portion of their future
cash flows in capital markets, they attempt to hedge by managing cash. The result is
reduced contemporaneous investments. Large banks in the payments system settle a large
volume of transactions on a daily basis and when the volume becomes large or uncertain,
they hold extra liquidity simply to be able to effect these transactions smoothly. If their
access to external financing dries up, this theory predicts them to hoard more cash. The
rationale for banks to hoard liquidity against aggregate financing shocks has also been
modeled in several papers.19
The theory of inter-bank markets generally agrees on its role as being one of liquidity
insurance and peer monitoring. The reasons why these markets may fail sometimes or
experience severe stress differ across studies. Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008) and Freixas,
19See, for example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Allen and Gale (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2001),
and Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008), among others.
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Martin and Skeie (2008) focus on incompleteness of contracting on liquidity shocks; Bhat-
tacharyya and Gale (1987), Flannery (1996), Bhattacharyya and Fulghieri (1994), Freixas
and Jorge (2007), and Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2008) focus on asymmetric infor-
mation and/or counterparty risk and related inefficiencies; finally, Acharya, Gromb and
Yorulmazer (2008) focus on issues arising due to market power and strategic behavior of
liquidity-surplus banks. Our findings suggest that the stress in inter-markets witnessed
in the first year of the sub-prime crisis is unlikely to have been due (entirely) to counter-
party risk concerns, since we find almost identical effects in the Sterling money markets
for overnight lending in secured as well as unsecured transactions.
While our results on transmission of an individual bank’s funding risk, and its precau-
tionary hoardings, to other banks do not find a direct parallel in the literature, this form
of contagion is similar in its overall spirit to that considered in models of aggregate liq-
uidity shortages. These include models due to Freixas and Rochet (1996), Allen and Gale
(2000), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Diamond
and Rajan (2005), and Acharya (2009) wherein banks are reliant on a common pool of
liquidity and one bank’s adversity reduces the available pool for others due to fire sales
of assets, deadweight losses from bad assets, or drawdowns of inter-bank deposits. Theo-
retical analysis wherein precautionary hoardings of affected banks are explicitly modeled
and shown to raise the cost of borrowing for healthier banks giving rise to an interest-rate
contagion has been analyzed in Acharya and Skeie (2011).
Our paper also relates to the literature on the microstructure of inter-bank markets.
Hamilton (1997) studies the role of bank liquidity in affecting the federal funds rate by
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employing as an instrument the “errors” in the Federal Reserve forecasts of the effect of its
operations on bank reserves. In contrast, we rely on the extent of payments activity as an
instrument. On this front, our approach is similar to that of Furfine (2000) who calibrates
a model as well as empirically demonstrates that daily fed funds rate variability is linked
to that of payment flows, and that higher payment flows lead to greater precautionary
reserves which put an upward pressure on the funds rate. We take a step further in
explaining that liquidity demand varies across banks as a precaution against their different
funding risks. Fecht, Nyborg and Rocholl (2010) study the German banks’ behavior in
ECB’s repo auctions during June 2000 to December 2001. They examine the effect of
bank-specific and market-wide factors on prices that banks pay for liquidity, measured as
their borrowing rates in repos with the ECB, and find (as we do) that the rate a bank
pays for liquidity depends on other banks’ liquidity, not just its own.
Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) also provide evidence consistent with precautionary target-
ing of reserves balances maintained by banks at the Federal Reserve and the role played
by “arbitrage” activity of banks using their reserves in ensuring that over-concentration
of reserves does not arise in some banks. Our results show that such arbitrage activ-
ity, prevalent before the sub-prime crisis, diminishes substantially during the crisis. In
contrast to the crisis of 2007-2008, Furfine (2002) finds that the inter-bank markets func-
tioned remarkably well in transferring liquidity in the banking system during the Autumn
of 1998 when Long Term Capital Management’s problems surfaced.
Finally, Ashcraft, McAndres and Skeie (2010) provide a theoretical model and em-
pirical evidence for the Federal Funds market showing that banks hold excess reserves
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intra-day as well as overnight, are reluctant to lend, and intra-day fed funds rate becomes
highly volatile due to precautionary behavior of banks in response to heightened payment
uncertainty (during the crisis of 2007-08). These results corroborate our findings for the
UK inter-bank markets. Our bank-level findings shed further light by explaining that the
precautionary response is mainly due to weaker banks but its effects are felt by all banks.
8 Conclusion
By examining the effect of a full-blown financial crisis (starting August 2007) on liquidity
demand of large settlement banks, and its effect on inter-bank market rates, we uncovered
an important precautionary channel that caused stress in the Sterling money markets.
The economics underlying these effects suggest that the channel was likely to be at work
in other countries too since they had their fair share of weakened financial institutions.
Perhaps most interestingly, our results showed that there can be a contagion-style systemic
risk in inter-bank markets whereby increase in the precautionary demand of liquidity by
some adversely affected banks leads to a rise in costs of borrowing liquidity for all other
banks, in both secured and unsecured markets.
On policy front, our evidence suggests that regulatory attempts to thaw such money
market stress and reduce variability of inter-bank rates, if successful, can have salubrious
effects on healthier parts of banking sector. Our results, however, suggest that to the
extent a part of the stress emanates from liquidity hoardings of banks with troubled
funding and balance-sheet conditions, such thawing should involve addressing insolvency
concerns (for example, early supervision and stress tests, and recapitalization of troubled
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banks) and not just provisions of emergency liquidity.
There are several important avenues for future work. Within the aggregate setting,
the substitution of liquidity demand between term (3-month) and overnight borrowing
seems an intriguing issue to investigate. Further, our study focused on identifying the
precautionary motive for liquidity. An additional channel – the “strategic” one – may
also be at work. There are two aspects to this channel. One is the strategic behavior
in terms of market power of some large players in the inter-bank markets (as suggested
theoretically by Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2008, and supported empirically by
Fecht, Nyborg and Rocholl, 2010). The second is the strategic behavior due to adversely
affected banks not disclosing their losses early enough and delaying asset sales (Diamond
and Rajan, 2010), and safer banks hoarding cash with the motive to acquire these assets at
deep discounts in future (Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011 and Diamond and Rajan,
2010). It is our prior that this kind of strategic effect was prevalent after the failure of
Lehman Brothers when the returns on various kind of assets and trading strategies rose
sky-high and an overall freeze resulted in the global financial system.
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Figure 1. Overnight liquidity held by settlement banks and their aggregate target 
Note: The overnight liquidity is the sum of the reserves accounts of all settlement banks balances 
measured at 5 am each day. Under the current monetary policy framework UK settlement banks 
choose a reserves target which they are required to achieve on average within maintenance 
period. They reset their reserves targets at the start of each maintenance period. The data are for 
10 UK settlement banks (foreign banks and subsidiaries are omitted).  
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 Figure 2. CHAPS payments activity (logarithm) 
Note: Payment activity (value) is the sum of all transactions that flow through CHAPS, the UK 
large-value payment system (real-time-gross settlement system operated by the Bank of 
England). It is net of overnight interbank loans activity. 
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 Figure 3. Overnight money market spreads (basis points) and key market events 
Note: The data are daily and cover the whole market. The secured rate is the Gilt Collateral (GC) 
rate. The unsecured overnight rate is the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA) rate.   
 
14 March: Bear Stearns distress
Mid-December to mid-February: Large loss announcements
by UBS, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Citigroup
14 September: Northern Rock receives emergency
lending facility
28 June open market operation
uncovered
09 August: BNP suspends calculation of the net asset value
of three money market funds and halts redemption
13 August: Goldman Sachs injects 3 bn USD into its statistical
arbitrage fund after 30% loss
17 August: Sachsen LB is bailed out
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Figure 4. Reserves target of high risk banks (three banks with highest loan to retail 
deposits ratio),and low risk banks (three banks with lowest loan to retail deposits 
ratio) in billion British pounds 
Note: The data cover 10 UK settlement banks (foreign banks are omitted). See figure 1 
and table 1 for a definition of the reserves target. The red vertical line indicates the start 
of the crisis.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
The data are from the Bank of England statistics division (when not specified otherwise) and most cover the period 02/01/07 to 30/06/08. Settlement (First-Tier) banks are the 
ten UK banks that settle their payments activity directly at the central bank. Overnight liquidity is the sum of the reserves accounts balances of those ten UK settlement banks 
measured at 5 am each day. Payment activity (value) is the sum of all transactions that flow through CHAPS in log(trillion £), the UK large-value payment system ( real-time-
gross settlement system operated by the Bank of England). The aggregate value of payments is net of interbank loans activity. Predicted payment activity is payment activity 
predicted by calendar effects as detailed in appendix 2. Aggregate (meaning covering the entire market) interest rates data are from the British Bankers'Association and the 
Wholesale Markets Brokers' Association. The secured rate is the Gilt Collateral (GC) rate. The unsecured overnight rate is the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA) 
rate.  The data are daily, when not specified otherwise, and cover the period 02/01/2007 to 30/06/2008. Mismatch I is the ratio of loan assets to retail deposits; mismatch II is 
the ratio of total assets over retail deposits (divided by 1000); deposit fragility is the ratio of sight deposits to time deposits; equity price fall is the cumulative decline in the 
equity price in number of standard deviation change relative to 2006 average. Balance-sheet data are monthly. 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Difference  P-value
Variables used in bank-level regressions
Settlement bank overnight liquidity (1) 0.10 1.07 -3.32 7.76 -1.18 -0.12 2.15
Payment activity 0.26 0.04 0.13 0.43 0.21 0.26 0.34
Predicted payment activity 0.23 0.02 0.12 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.25
Aggregate variables 
ln( Settlement banks overnight liquidity billion £) 2.39 0.25 1.62 3.18 1.96 2.40 2.79 -0.27 0.00
(-0.26) (0.00)
Total settlement banks overnight liquidity in % 
deviation from aggregate target 25.00 23.35 -33.90 185.57 -10.19 23.36 63.82 2.435 0.322
(3.34) (0.17)
Secured overnight rate spread to policy rate (basis 
points) 6.25 12.65 -14.17 108.33 -3.88 4.50 17.50 -2.41 0.045
(-5.51) (0.00)
Unsecured overnight rate spread to policy rate 
(basis points) 11.47 13.31 -9.37 125.38 3.98 9.38 29.22 -0.66 0.61
(-1.60) (0.09)
Risk metrics
Mismatch I 1.68 1.19 0.90 6.50 0.90 1.40 4.80
Mismatch II 0.14 0.27 0.01 1.13 0.01 0.03 0.88
Deposit fragility 0.52 0.10 0.23 0.72 0.31 0.55 0.69
Equity price fall 0.27 0.57 -0.17 3.98 -0.13 0.09 1.37
Risk-weighted assets/total assets 0.45 0.29 0.15 1.53 0.16 0.44 1.08
(1) Normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. 
In parentheses we report values excluding the period spanning the uncovered OMO
(pre-August 9th) - 
(post August 9th)
Table 2. Bai-Perron Multiple Level Break Tests on Settlement Bank Liquidity 
The Bai and Perron (1998) sequential algorithm is used to estimate the timing of (lasting) level shifts in the settlement bank liquidity. This method applies an 
algorithm that searches all possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks the set that produces the maximum goodness-of-fit. The WD max 
is used to investigate if at least one break is present. If there is evidence for one break the method continues to add breaks until the supLRT(l+1/l) test fails to 
reject the hypothesis of no additional structural changes at the 5% level or there is no room for more breaks. We allow for heterogeneous and autocorrelated 
errors as outlined in Bai and Perron (2003). The trimming parameter is set to 15%. This implies a minimal window length of about 2 months. The test results 
are reported in this table together with a timeline of relevant events put together using Bloomberg. See Table 1 for a definition of overnight liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
Break Dates 95 % Interval Estimates Key Market News Date
Bank of England announces emergency lending facility to Northern Rock 14 September 2007
11/09/2007 [23/08/07;18/09/07] 2.474*** Bank of England supplies additional reserves to the banking system +25% (one week maturity) 13 September 2007
(0.017) UBS says it would make write downs of $3.4bn to its fixed income portfolio 01 October 2007
13/03/2008 [04/03/08;08/04/08] 2.629*** Citigroup says Q3 earnings will fall 60% on a year ago 01 October 2007
(0.023) Merrill Lynch announces it will make a loss in Q3 due to a $5.5bn write-down 05 October 2007
UDmax SupLRt(2/1) SupLRt(3/2) Merrill Lynch reports write-downs of $7.9 bn on sub-prime mortgages and asset-backed securities 24 October 2007
112.673*** 17.392*** 8.936 Morgan Stanley announces a $3.7bn loss on sub-prime structured credit 08 November 2007
Rumours of a $10bn write-down by Barclays relating to securities backed by sub-prime mortgages 09 November 2007
Bank of America's CEO pre-announces writedowns of $3bn in Q4. 13 November 2007
Bear Stearns announces an expected write down of $1.2bn in Q4 14 November 2007
Freddia Mac announces a Q3 loss of $2bn 20 November 2007
UBS announces further write downs of $10bn (dated to end November) 10 December 2007
Bank of America announces it may have to record more than its initial $3.3 billion losses and write-downs 12 December 2007
Citigroup announces it is to raise at least $14.5 billion in new capital 15 January 2008
Merrill Lynch reports $ 10.3 billion loss 17 January 2008
Ambac announces Q4 net loss of $3.225 billion 22 January 2008
XL capital Ltd expects Q4 net loss of up to $1.2 billion 23 January 2008
Credit Suisse announces additional $2.85 billion losses 19 February 2008
JP Morgan agrees to provide secured lending to Bear Stearns 14 March 2008
JP Morgan agrees to purchase Bear Stearns for $2 per share 16 March 2008
Fed gives primary dealers effective access to the discount window through a new credit facility 16 March 2008
HBOS equity price falls sharply on rumours of liquidity problems. HBOS denies any problem. 19 March 2008
Note: (***) stands for significant at the 1 per cent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Liquidity is measured as the sum of reserves accounts held at the central bank. 
Table 3. Precautionary liquidity demand  
This table reports estimates of equation (1). We express an individual bank demand for overnight liquidity as a function of the predictable aggregate level of 
payment activity, allowing for a shift in this relationship during the crisis. See Table 1 for a definition of liquidity and payment activity. Predicted payment 
activity is payment activity predicted by calendar effects as detailed in appendix 2. Overnight liquidity is normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the 
standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. The regressions are run on data covering the 10 UK settlement banks in the period January 2 
2007 to June 30 2008. Break1 is a dummy variable that takes value one post 11/09/07; and Break2 takes value one post 13/03/2008. We report robust standard 
errors in brackets.  
Dependent variable: individual settlement bank overnight liquidity as a function of predictable payment activity 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payment activity -4.170** -7.018** -7.018** -13.996*** -4.207* -4.104*
[1.327] [2.317] [2.317] [4.082] [1.985] [1.965]
Payment activity*Break1 5.125** 5.107** 8.831** 4.549** 4.404**
[2.105] [2.077] [3.435] [1.907] [1.881]
Payment activity*Break2 -4.552
[4.665]
Lagged deviation from target 0.002
[0.001]
Break1 -0.773 -0.846 -1.635* -0.634 -0.607
[0.536] [0.523] [0.866] [0.502] [0.494]
Break2 1.290
[1.144]
Uncovered omo -0.264
[0.197]
Constant 1.067*** 1.505** 1.505** 3.095** 0.949 0.928
[0.308] [0.567] [0.567] [0.972] [0.539] [0.534]
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
Maintenance days fixed effects x x
Bank fixed effects x x x x x x
Nber of Observations 3760 3760 3760 2950 3760 3760
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Table 4. Relationship between liquidity demand and bank risk  
We estimate an individual bank demand for liquidity as a function of alternative risk metrics. See Table 1 for a definition of  overnight liquidity. Overnight 
liquidity is normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. In column (1) risk is 
measured by the ratio of loan assets to retail deposits (Mismatch I); in column (2)  risk is total assets divided by retail deposits (Mismatch II); in column (3) risk 
is the ratio of sight deposits to time deposits (Deposit fragility); in column (4) risk is the cumulative equity price fall; in column (5) risk is the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets. The regressions are run on data covering the 10 UK settlement banks in the period January 2 2007 to June 30 2008. Break1 is a 
dummy variable that takes value one post 11/09/07. We report robust standard errors in brackets.  
 
Dependent variable: Individual settlement bank overnight liquidity 
Mismatch I Mismatch II Deposit fragility Equity price fall
Risk-weighted 
assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk -0.072* 0.038 -1.589 -0.078*** -1.344***
[0.037] [0.358] [1.505] [0.021] [0.398]
Risk*Break1 0.157*** 0.776*** -0.854 0.070*** 0.737*
[0.041] [0.186] [1.123] [0.016] [0.365]
Break1 0.281 0.447** 0.81 0.619** 0.177
[0.217] [0.177] [0.627] [0.175] [0.285]
Constant -0.046 -0.176 0.724 -0.273** 0.411**
[0.144] [0.123] [0.792] [0.097] [0.154]
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06
Bank fixed effects x x x x x
Nber of Observations 3016 3016 3770 2582 3329
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Table 5. Relationship between liquidity demand, payment activity, and bank risk  
We estimate an individual bank demand for liquidity as a function of predicted payment activity interacted 
with alternative risk rankings. See Table 1 for a definition of liquidity and (predict) payment activity. 
Liquidity is normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over 
the first 12 sample months. In column (1) risk is measured by the ratio of loan assets to retail deposits 
(Mismatch I); in column (2)  risk is total assets divided by retail deposits (Mismatch II); in column (3) risk is 
the ratio of sight deposits to time deposits (Deposit fragility); in column (4) risk is the cumulative equity 
price fall; in column (5) risk is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets.  We split the sample of ten 
banks in three groups according to the value of the risk metric used: high risk for top 3 banks (HR dummy), 
medium risk for middle 4 banks (MR dummy), and low risk for bottom 3 banks (LR dummy). The 
regressions are run on data covering the 10 UK settlement banks in the period January 2 2007 to June 30 
2008. Break1 is a dummy variable that takes value one post 11/09/07. We report robust standard errors in 
brackets.  
 
 
 
Mismatch I Mismatch II
Deposit 
fragility
Equity price 
fall
Risk-weighted 
assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Payment activity*LR  -8.800*** -10.057*** -10.791*** -0.754 -5.619*
[2.181] [2.383] [1.463] [1.550] [2.738]
Payment activity*MR -10.178*** -9.235*** -8.751*** -7.501** -9.144**
[2.566] [2.099] [2.317] [2.753] [2.814]
Payment activity*HR -5.067** -5.067*** -8.815* -4.281** -8.620**
[1.463] [1.447] [3.791] [1.628] [2.682]
Payment activity*Break1*LR 6.431** 6.052* 5.712* 2.003 4.064
[2.226] [2.563] [2.614] [2.771] [2.568]
Payment activity*Break1*MR 6.945** 7.230** 6.757** 3.038 6.309**
[2.450] [2.454] [2.239] [2.156] [2.257]
Payment activity*Break1*HR 8.938** 8.938** 8.257** 6.121* 7.213***
[2.614] [2.585] [2.396] [2.938] [1.877]
Break1 -1.089 -1.089 -1.089 -0.375 -0.99
[0.611] [0.604] [0.611] [0.648] [0.548]
Tests p-values X=Payment activity
X*HR*Break1=X*LR*Break1 0.02 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.01
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.08
Bank fixed effect x x x x x
Nber of Observations 3016 3016 3770 2582 3329
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Table 6. The impact of settlement banks precautionary liquidity hoarding on overnight  money market spreads 
We report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the liquidity effect on market-wide overnight secured and unsecured rates. All spreads are in basis points. 
All variables are defined in Table 1 and sources reported. The market data are aggregated daily data for the period January 2 2007 to June 30 2008. Liquidity is 
the sum of the ten first-tier UK settlement banks reserves balances held at the central bank. Break1 is a dummy variable that takes value one post 11/09/07. We 
report in brackets robust standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 secured spread unsecured spread secured spread unsecured spread
Liquidity -10.427** -10.413** -0.138*** -0.120***
[4.457] [4.832] [0.040] [0.044]
Liquidity*Break1 12.609** 13.623** 0.115** 0.149***
[5.998] [6.503] [0.051] [0.056]
Break1 -30.572** -36.707** -4.754*** -9.076***
[14.247] [15.446] [1.758] [1.917]
Constant 29.760*** 36.943*** 9.978*** 16.744***
[10.014] [10.856] [1.361] [1.485]
Nber of Observations 296 296 295 295
Note:  (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Liquidity=ln(reserves balances)
Liquidity=reserves balances in % deviation 
from aggregate target
(1) (2)
Table 7. Descriptive statistics: bilateral money market data  
The bilateral data on money market activity are derived from transaction level information extracted from the Bank of England payments database. The data 
cover 10 UK settlement banks over 22 maintenance periods in the period January 2007 to June 2008. Spread is the bilateral spread, i.e. the cost of borrowing 
charged by one bank to the other and volume is the bilateral liquidity flow, the volume lent by one bank to another bank. The spread is the average value-
weighted interest rate charged by one bank to another minus the policy rate, in basis points. The bilateral volume is the sum of all interbank loan transactions 
between any two banks within a maintenance period. Reserves target is the amount of reserves each bank chooses at the start of each maintenance period to 
target on average over the maintenance period. The reserves target of a bank is scaled by the bank payment activity, as a proxy for bank size. The volume lent is 
scaled by the lender payment activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Spread 6.15 9.15 -87.00 110.00 -1.88 5.67 19.94
Volume/payment activity 0.31 0.26 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.33 0.71
Reserves target/payment activity 0.19 0.22 0.02  1.24 0.02 0.12 0.69
Table 8. Sensitivity of bilateral trade volumes and spreads to lender and borrower 
liquidity endowments  
The dependent variable is the bilateral spread or the bilateral volume. The specification for the spread 
corrects for sample selection (heckman model) where the probability of a positive trade is predicted in the 
first stage by the amount of bilateral payments net of interbank loans. The selection equation is reported in 
appendix 3.  The sample covers 10 UK banks over 22 maintenance periods in the period January 2007 to 
June 2008. All specifications include maintenance period fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by bank-
pair are reported in brackets. See table 7 for a definition of the spread, the volumes, and reserves. A bank 
reserves target of a bank is scaled by its payment activity. The volume is scaled by the lender payment 
activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower reserves target -1.993 1.646 -1.361*** -1.332***
[1.997] [3.538] [0.191] [0.177]
Lender reserves target 3.840*** 0.578 -0.914*** -1.051***
[1.114] [1.759] [0.198] [0.186]
Borrower reserves target*crisis -8.017** -0.063
[3.408] [0.149]
Lender reserves target *crisis 5.929*** 0.247***
[1.912] [0.081]
Number of observations 1203 1203 1694 1694
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Heckman model Tobit
Spread Volume
    Appendix 1. Adjustments to the monetary policy framework during the 
crisis  
     
The current monetary policy framework of the Bank of England (BoE) is designed to enable 
it to continue achieving its primary rate-setting objective while responding to any sudden or 
pronounced shifts in demand for central bank money.  
During the market turbulence of 2007-2008 the BoE undertook a range of adjustments to its 
framework giving leeway for banks to build up larger liquidity buffers. By and large, all of 
the changes were a response to stress in inter-bank markets and thus should be viewed as 
endogenous, rather than being "natural experiments." 
    (1) On September 13th and 18th 2007, the BoE offered an extra (i.e. above aggregate 
target) £4.4bn(each time) in its regular weekly open market operations, amounting to 25% of 
the aggregate reserves target for the current maintenance period. This was accommodated by 
an increase in the reserves band around target from 1% to 37.5%. These actions were taken to 
help offset the disturbance to conditions in the short-term money markets following the 
announcement of lender of last resort assistance to Northern Rock on September 14th 2007. 
In particular, it was a recognition that reserves banks might need extra reserves over and 
above their announced targets at beginning of the current maintenance period. 
    (2) The BoE further announced on 19th September 2007 that in order to alleviate strains in 
longer-maturity money markets it would conduct auctions to provide funds at 3 month 
maturity against a wider range of collateral (including mortgage collateral) than in the BoE's 
weekly open market operations. While this change may have indirectly affected bank demand 
for liquidity, it does not directly affect our analysis as we focus on overnight inter-bank 
markets. 
    (3) For the maintenance period beginning on October 4th 2007, the ranges around reserves 
banks' targets within which reserves are remunerated were widened from +/-1% to +/-30%. 
The target ranges remained at this level until July 10th 2008 when they were reduced to +/-
20%. Further, in view of the increase in the reserves targets set by reserves scheme members 
and the potential for future increase, with effect from the maintenance period starting on May 
8th 2008, the BoE more than doubled the reserves target ceiling it sets for each reserves 
scheme member. Both of these changes allowed banks to respond more to perceived risks 
through their reserves balances at the BoE. 
    (4) On April 21st 2008, the BoE introduced the special liquidity scheme to deal with the 
overhang of existing assets on banks' balance sheets. The scheme allows banks and building 
societies to swap for up to three years some of their illiquid assets for liquid Treasury Bills. In 
other words, the purpose of the Scheme is to finance part of the overhang of currently illiquid 
assets by exchanging them temporarily with more easily tradable assets. The banks can then 
use these assets to finance themselves more normally. All of the banks and building societies 
that are eligible to sign up for the standing deposit and lending facilities within the Bank's 
Sterling Monetary Framework are able to take part in the Scheme. It was widely perceived 
that like the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) in the United States, 
this liquidity scheme played a significant role in easing concerns of funding against illiquid 
collateral and diffused funding risks (at least temporarily). 
Appendix 2. Calendar Effects on the Aggregate level of Payments Activity 
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of a regression of payment activity (the aggregate 
logarithm of the payments value between all UK banks) on various calendar effects.  UK holidays is a 
dummy taking value one on days immediately preceeding and following bank holidays; US holidays takes 
value one on US holidays and so on so forth. "Quarter 1" takes value one on each day of the last week of the 
first quarter and so on so forth.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicates 
significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. The results indicate that up to 75 per 
cent of the variation in payment activity can be explained by few calendar dummies. 
 
Calendar Dummies (1)
United Kingdom Holidays [-1;+1] 0.073*
(0.039)
United States Holidays [0] -0.575***
(0.032)
First 5 days of the month 0.002
(0.018)
Last 5 days of the month -0.009
(0.022)
Tuesday -0.110***
(0.022)
Wednesday -0.092***
(0.020)
Thursday -0.059***
(0.019)
Friday -0.002
(0.021)
Quarter 1 0.081
(0.064)
Quarter 2 0.035
(0.06)
Quarter 3 0.138
(0.107)
Quarter 4 -0.111***
(0.031)
constant 5.497***
(0.015)
Portmanteau Test for White Noise 0.29
at Lag-1 P-value 
R-squared 0.38
Nber of Observations 376
Note: The portmenteau test is run on the residuals from regressions that exclude the constant term.
Monday is the omitted day.
 Appendix 3. Selection equation 
This table reports logit estimates of the probability of two banks (i and j) being counterparties in the 
interbank market as a function of the amount of their bilateral payment activity (net of interbank loan 
activity). See Table 1 for a definition of payment activity. The sample covers 10 UK banks over 22 
maintenance periods in the period January 2007 to June 2008. Both specifications include maintenance 
period fixed effects. Specification (2) includes lender and borrower fixed effects in addition.  
 
 
(1) (2) 
Payment activity ij 0.377** 0.380**
[0.161] [0.158]
Payment activity ji 0.352** 0.694***
[0.179] [0.190]
Nber. of observations 1366 1686
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
